We address the problem of robust state estimation and attack isolation for a class of discrete-time nonlinear systems with positive-slope nonlinearities under (potentially unbounded) sensor attacks and measurement noise. We consider the case when a subset of sensors is subject to additive false data injection attacks. Using a bank of circle-criterion observers, each observer leading to an Input-to-State Stable (ISS) estimation error, we propose a estimator that provides robust estimates of the system state in spite of sensor attacks and measurement noise; and an algorithm for detecting and isolating sensor attacks. Our results make use of the ISS property of the observers to check whether the trajectories of observers are consistent with the attack-free trajectories of the system. Simulations results are presented to illustrate the performance of the results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Networked Control Systems (NCSs) have emerged as a technology that combines control, communication, and computation and offers the necessary flexibility to meet new demands in distributed and large scale systems. Recently, security of NCSs has become an important issue as wireless communication networks might serve as new access points for attackers to adversely affect the operation of the system dynamics. Cyber-physical attacks on NCSs have caused substantial damage to a number of physical processes. One of the most well-known examples is the attack on Maroochy Shire Councils sewage control system in Queensland, Australia that happened in January 2000. The attacker hacked into the controllers that activate and deactivate valves and caused flooding of the grounds of a hotel, a park, and a river with a million liters of sewage. Another incident is the very recent SuxNet virus that targeted Siemens supervisory control and data acquisition systems which are used in many industrial processes. It follows that strategic mechanisms to identify and deal with attacks on NCSs are strongly needed.
In [1] - [22] , a range of topics related to security of control systems have been discussed. In general, they provide analysis tools for quantifying the performance degradation induced by different classes of attacks; and propose reaction strategies to identify and counter their effect on the system dynamics. Most of the existing work, however, has considered control systems with linear dynamics, although in most engineering applications the dynamics of the plants being monitored and controlled is highly nonlinear. There are some results addressing the nonlinear case though. In [23] , exploiting tianciy@student.unimelb.edu.au sensor redundancy, the authors address the problem of sensor attack detection and state estimation for uniformly observable continuous-time nonlinear systems. Similarly, in [24] , the authors provide an algorithm for isolating sensor attacks for a class of discrete-time nonlinear systems with bounded measurement noise.
In this manuscript, we consider the case when the system has p sensors, all of which are subject to measurement noise and up to q < p/2 of them are attacked. Following the results in [25] for linear systems, using a bank of circle criterion observers [26] - [29] , each observer leading to an ISS estimation error, we construct an estimator that provides robust estimates of the system state in spite of sensor attacks. In particular, the proposed estimator leads to estimation errors satisfying an ISS property with respect to measurement noise but independent of attack signals. Next, we propose an algorithm for detecting and isolating false data injection sensor attacks. Our results make use of the ISS property of the observers to check whether the trajectories of observers are consistent with the attack-free trajectories of the system. The main idea behind our results is the following. Each observer in the bank is driven by a different subset of sensors. Thus, without attacks, the observers produce ISS estimation errors with respect to measurement noise only. For every pair of observers in the bank, we compute the largest difference between their estimates. If a pair of observers is driven by a subset of attack-free sensors, then the largest difference between their estimates is also ISS with respect to measurement noise only. However, if there are attacks on some of the sensors, the observers driven by those sensors might produce larger differences than the attack-free ones. These ideas work well under the assumption that less than p/2 sensors are attacked, i.e, q < p/2. To design the observers in the bank, we give an extension to the result in [28] for designing robust discrete-time circle-criterion observers. In particular, we use the incremental multiplier technique introduced in [29] to cast the observer design as the solution of a semidefinite program. We minimize the ISSgain from the measurement noise to the estimation error.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present preliminary results needed for the subsequent sections. In Section III, we provide tools for designing optimal robust circle criterion observers in the attack-free case. In Section IV, assuming that a sufficiently small number of sensors are subject to attacks, we propose an estimation scheme using a bank of robust circle criterion observers. In Section V, an algorithm for isolating sensor attacks is given. Finally, in Section VI, we give concluding remarks.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notation
We denote the set of real numbers by R, the set of natural numbers by N , the set of integers by Z, and R n×m the set of n × m matrices for any m, n ∈ N. For any vector v ∈ R n , we denote v J the stacking of all
We denote the cardinality of a set S as card(S). We denote matrix P to be positive definite as P > 0. The identity matrix is denoted by I. A function β : R ≥0 × R ≥0 → R ≥0 is said to be of class exp − KL if there exist c > 0 and λ ∈ (0, 1), such that β(s, k) = cλ k s. The binomial coefficient is denoted as a b , where a, b are nonnegative integers. We denote a variable m uniformly distributed in the interval (a, b) as m ∼ U(a, b).
B. Preliminary Definitions
Definition 2 (Input-to-State Stability). Consider the discrete time system e + = F (e, m),
with state e ∈ R n and input m ∈ R p , {m(k)} ∈ l ∞ . System (2) is said to be Input-to-State Stable (ISS) with linear gain γ and exp − KL function, if there exist c > 0, λ ∈ (0, 1), and γ ≥ 0 such that the following inequality is satisfied:
for all e(0) ∈ R n , k ≥ 0, and {m(k)} ∈ l ∞ .
III. ROBUST CIRCLE-CRITERION OBSERVER
In [28] , using the circle criterion, the authors design observers for discrete-time nonlinear systems with no disturbances. In this section, we give an extension to the result in [28] by considering measurement noise. The design method follows the ideas in [29] where the nonlinearity is characterized by an incremental multiplier matrix. We present an extension to the result in [29] by casting the observer design as a semidefinite program with more degrees of freedom, which might lead to a less conservative ISS gains. We consider discrete-time nonlinear systems of the form:
with state x ∈ R n , output y ∈ R ny , sensor noise m ∈ R ny , {m(k)} ∈ l ∞ , and matrices G ∈ R n×r and H ∈ R r×n . The term ρ(u, y) is a known real-valued vector that depends on the system inputs and outputs. The nonlinearity f (Hx) is an r-dimensional vector where each entry is a function of a linear combination of the states:
where H ij denotes the entries of the matrix H.
Assumption 1 For all i ∈ {1, . . . , r}, the following holds
Consider the circle criterion observer:
with observer statex ∈ R n (the estimate of x), and observer gain matrices K ∈ R r×ny and L ∈ R n×ny to be designed. Define the estimation error e :=x − x. It follows that the estimation error dynamics is given by the following difference equation:
where
q := Hx,q := Hx + K(ŷ − y),ŷ := Cx, and
We aim at designing the observer matrices K and L such that the estimation error dynamics is ISS with a linear gain and an exp − KL function with respect to the measurement noise. Theorem 1 Consider system (4), for given c 3 ∈ (0, 1), if there exist positive definite matrix P ∈ R n×n , matrices Y ∈ R n×ny and matrix Y 2 ∈ R r×ny , and scalars κ > 0, µ > 0, and µ 1 > 0 satisfying:
with Ξ 21 and Ξ 22 defined as
M defined as
with κ > 0, which is an incremental multiplier matrix for f (·), and
then, the observer (7) with L = P −1 Y, K = Y2 κ has ISS error dynamics with a linear gain γ = √ µµ 1 and an exp − KL function with respect to m.
Proof: See Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 in [30] . Theorem 1 provides a tool for designing the observer (4). If we minimize √ µµ 1 subject to (11) , the obtained observer minimizes the effect of noise on the estimation error. To have a convex objective function, we use µ + µ 1 instead of √ µµ 1 .
Because (µ + µ 1 ) 2 ≥ 4µµ 1 ; then, γ = √ µµ 1 ≤ 1 2 (µ + µ 1 ) since µ and µ 1 are positive. Therefore, by minimizing µ+µ 1 , we minimize an upper bound on γ. Since c 3 ∈ (0, 1) (a bounded set), we could perform a grid-search over c 3 , i.e., we make a grid in (0, 1), for each grid point we minimize µ+µ 1 subject to (11) , and we choose the c 3 that minimizes √ µµ 1 to construct the observer. In our design method, besides regarding µ 1 as a variable, we also do not assume c 3 is a fixed constant as it is done in [29] . We use the model used in Example 1 in [28] and compare the performance of both observers. All the optimizations are solved using PENLAB [31] in MATLAB. Example 1 Consider the discrete-time nonlinear system subject to measurement noise:
x + m.
We let δ = 0.1 and α = 1. Matrices (14) can be written in the form (4) with Assumption 1 being satisfied, see [28] for details. We minimizing µ + µ 1 subject to (11) and perform a grid search over c 3 to obtain observer matrices K and L.
The smallest ISS gain is γ = 0.924 for c 3 = 0.9. Next, we minimize µ subject to the LMIs in [29] with c 3 = 0.5, M as in (13), and H = I. The corresponding observer leads to γ = 22.4. We let m i ∼ U(−0.5, 0.5) for i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}.
The initial conditions are randomly selected from a normal distribution andx(0) = [0, 0] . We depict the performance of these observers in Figures 1-2 .
IV. OBSERVER-BASED ESTIMATOR UNDER SENSOR
ATTACKS AND SENSOR NOISE
In this section, we introduce a circle-criterion observerbased estimator for the class systems described in Section III. We assume that a small number of sensors are subject to sensor attacks:
x + =Ax + Gf (Hx) + ρ(u, y), is not attacked, then the i-th component of the vector a(k), a i (k) = 0, ∀k ≥ 0; otherwise, sensor i is attacked and a i (k) is arbitrary and possibly unbounded. We denote W ⊆ {1, . . . , p} the set of attacked sensors, then we have supp(a(k)) = W for all k ≥ 0. We assume the set W is unknown to us. We denoteỹ k; x(0), a [0,k] ,m [0,k] as the output of the system at time k when the initial state is x(0) and the outputs are subject to measurement noisẽ m and sensor attacks a. The nonlinearity f (·) satisfies (5) and (6) . We aim at obtaining an observer-based estimator that provides exponential convergence of the estimatesx(k) to a neighborhood of the true states x(k) and an ISS estimation error e(k) =x(k) − x(k) with a linear gain and exp − KL function with respect to the measurement noise and independent of sensor attacks. That is, the estimation error satisfies |e(k)| ≤cλ k |e(0)| +γ y ||m|| k , for somec > 0, λ ∈ (0, 1), andγ y ≥ 0, and all e(0) ∈ R n , k ≥ 0.
In what follows, we introduce our estimation strategy which is inspired by the method in [25] for the linear case. For (15) , let 0 < q < p 2 be the largest integer such that for each set J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} of sensors with card(J) ≥ p − 2q, a circle-criterion observer of the form:
exists forỹ J . Here,x J denotes the estimate of the state x fromỹ J , and K J , L J are the corresponding observer gains. MatrixC J is the stacking of allC i , i ∈ J, whereC i is the i-th row ofC. When we say that the observer exists forỹ J , we mean that, if a J (k) = 0 for all k ≥ 0, the error of each observer e J (k) =x J (k) − x(k) with the following dynamics 
To construct the estimator, we need that among the p sensors, there are at least p−q attack-free sensors, and among each p−q sensors, there are at least p−2q attack-free sensors. To satisfy this, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2 There are at most q sensors attacked,
Using the design method proposed in Section III, we construct an observer for each set J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = p − q and for each set S ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(S) = p − 2q. For each set J with card(J) = p − q, we define π J (k) for all k ≥ 0 as the largest deviation between the estimatex J (k) and the estimatex S (k) that is given by any set S ⊂ J with card(S) = p − 2q. That is
By assumption, among the p sensors, there is at least one setĪ ⊂ {1, . . . , p} of sensors with card(Ī) = p − q that yĪ = CĪ x +mĪ as aĪ = 0; then, in general, all the estimates that appear in the definition of πĪ (k) are more consistent than those corresponding to the sets J with card(J) = p − q andỹ J =C J x + a J +m J with a J = 0. This motivates the following state estimation strategy: For all k ≥ 0, σ(k) := arg min J⊂{1,...,p}:card(J)=p−q π J (k);
then, we say that the estimate given by the set σ(k) is a good estimate, i.e.,x (k) =x σ(k) (k), wherex σ(k) (k) denotes the estimate given by the set σ(k).
The following result states that the proposed estimator is robust with respect to sensor attacks and measurement noise. (22). Let Assumptions 1 and Assumption 2 be satisfied; then, there exist constantsc > 0,λ ∈ (0, 1), and γ y ≥ 0 satisfying:
for all e(0) ∈ R n , k ≥ 0, andm ∈ R p , {m(k)} ∈ l ∞ .
Proof: The proof of Theorem 2 can be found in [30] .
Example 2 Consider the following system subject to noise and sensor attacks:
x + a +m.
Again, we let δ = 0.1, α = 1, andm i ∼ U(−0.5, 0.5) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. We find that the circle-criterion observer of the form (16) exists for each set of J ⊂ {1, 2, 3, 4} with card(J) ≥ 1 and p = 4. Hence, we have q = 1. We let W = {3}, which means the 3-rd sensor is under attack. Using the design method proposed in Section III, we design an observer for each J ⊂ {1, 2, 3, 4} with card(J) = 3 and each S ⊂ {1, 2, 3, 4} with card(S) = 2. Therefore, 4 3 Let q be the largest integer such that a circle-criterion observer exists for each set J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) ≥ p−2q. We propose an algorithm for isolating attacked sensors assuming that we know how many sensors are attacked, which is denoted as q (q ≤ q).
Assumption 3 There are q ≤ q attacked sensors, i.e.,
and q ≤ q is a known positive integer.
We construct a circle-criterion observer for each set J ⊂ {1, . . . , p) with card(J) = p − q and for each set S ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(S) = p − 2q . For each set J with card(J) = p − q and for all k ≥ 0, we define π J (k) as
Since there are q sensors under attack, we know there is one setĪ ⊂ {1, . . . , p} of sensors with card(Ī) = p − q withỹĪ =CĪ x +mĪ because aĪ = 0. Then, in general, all of the estimates that appear in the definition of π Ī (k) are more consistent than the estimates corresponding to all the sets J with card(J) = p−q andỹ J =C J x+a J +m J with a J = 0. For all k > 0, denoteJ(k) as the set of attack-free sensors at time k, thenJ(k) is given as
Then, the set {1, . . . , p} \J(k) is isolated as the set of attacked sensors at time k. Note, however, that it is still possible that for some k > 0 and some J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = p − q , a J (k) = 0 but J =J(k), which would result in wrong isolation. To improve the isolation performance, we perform the isolation over windows of N ∈ N time-steps. That is, in every N timesteps, where N ∈ Z >0 is the window size we choose, we keep obtainingJ(k) from (27) for each k, and we choose the set J(i) that is equal toJ(k) most often in the i-th window. Then we say that {1, . . . , p} \ J(i) is the set of sensors potentially under attack in the i-th time window. 7. For each i ∈ Z >0 , the set of sensors under attack is given as:
A(i) = {1, . . . , p} \ J(i).
8. For each i ∈ Z >0 , returnÃ(i).
Example 3
Consider system (24) with δ = 0.1 and α = 1. In each case, we letm i ∼ U(−0.5, 0.5) for i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, q = 1 ,W = {3}, a 3 ∼ U(−b, b), and b = 1, 2.5. We choose the window size N to be 50, 100, 200. We apply Algorithm 1 by running 4 2 + 4 3 = 10 circle-criterion observers initialized atx(0) = [0, 0] . The system initial conditions are randomly selected from a standard normal distribution. We follow the steps in Algorithm 1 and check in 1000 time-steps which sensor is isolated in each time window. The obtained results are shown in Figures 5-6 .
VI. CONCLUSION
We have provided a design method for discrete-time circle-criterion observers robust to measurement noise in terms of semidefinite programs. We have proposed a circlecriterion observer-based estimation strategy in the presence of measurement noise and sensor attacks. We have proved that the designed estimator provides ISS estimation errors with a linear gain and an exp − KL function with respect to measurement noise when a sufficiently small subset of sensors are corrupted by (potentially unbounded) attack signals. Finally, we have provided an algorithm for isolating attacked sensors using the proposed estimator. 
